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The Trigger Price Mechanism: Does It Prevent
Dumping by Foreign Steelmakers?
U.S. imports of low priced foreign steel products surged to record
levels in 1977 as a result of a worldwide surplus of steel.' Domestic steel
producers asserted that foreign manufacturers were selling their products
in the United States at "less than fair value" in violation of the An-
tidumping Act of 1921.2 In response to pressure from U.S. manufactur-
ers, President Carter appointed an Interagency Task Force, chaired by
Under Secretary of Treasury Anthony M. Solomon, to study the
problems of the steel industry. On December 6, 1977, the Task Force
released the Solomon Report,3 which recommended that the Treasury
Department adopt a system of "trigger prices" to facilitate monitoring of
steel imports under the Antidumping Act. President Carter approved
the recommendation of the Solomon Report, and in January 1978 the
Treasury Department implemented a complex trigger price mechanism.
The scope of the trigger price mechanism (TPM) is limited to basic
steel mill products. 4 Essentially, it is a system of prices assigned to basic
steel mill products representing the lowest fair price a foreign manufac-
turer may charge for such products in the United States without dump-
ing. The Treasury Department determines the base price by calculating
the full cost of producing and shipping steel to the United States by the
most efficient foreign manufacturer. 5 Any imported steel sold for less
than this base price "triggers" an immediate, informal investigation by
I Foreign producers of steel increased their share of the domestic market from 14% in
1976 to 18% in 1977, exceeding the previous peak level of imports reached in 1971. NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 20, 1978, at 105.
2 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-77 (1976) (current version at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1673-77 (West Supp.
1979)).
3 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: A COMPREHENSIVE PRO-
GRAM FOR THE STEEL INDUSTRY (Dec. 6, 1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 955
(1978) [hereinafter cited as SOLOMON REPORT].
4 Basic steel mill products are those products listed by the American Iron and Steel Insti-
tute (AISI) as basic steel mill products. The AISI has defined 32 product categories that include
such items as flat-rolled steel, alloy steel plates and steel rod. The TPM covers about 26 of these
32 categories, but it does not cover all the different products within any given category. For
example, the TPM might cover one type of wire product but not another. The Secretary de-
cided to limit the TPM to certain major products within each product category in order to
facilitate enforcement of the trigger price. However, the classification scheme adopted by the
Secretary was arbitrary and resulted in a legal challenge to the entire TPM. See Part III, infta.
For a complete list of the AISI's 32 basic steel mill products see 43 Fed. Reg. 6068 (1978).
5 Part II contains a detailed description of how the Treasury Department calculates the
TPM.
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the Customs Service. If this inquiry reveals questionable sales by a for-
eign manufacturer, the Secretary initiates an accelerated dumping inves-
tigation. 6 If the Secretary's fast-track investigation 7 reveals that sales
below fair value have occurred, and the International Trade Commission
certifies that these sales resulted in material injury" to the domestic steel
industry, the Treasury Department assesses a dumping duty in accord-
ance with the Antidumping Act.
I. Shortcomings of the Antidumping Act
The Solomon Report recommended adoption of the TPM because
of widespread dissatisfaction in the steel industry with the government's
attempts to prevent sales of foreign steel products at less than fair value
(LTFV).9 Industry officials have long asserted that the Antidumping
Act was too cumbersome to provide relief from sudden surges of imports
that might cause injury to U.S. industry.' 0 The Solomon Report sub-
stantiated these complaints; it estimated that the average dumping inves-
tigation, from the time a manufacturer files its complaint until the
Secretary publishes a dumping finding, requires approximately thirteen
months to complete."
From these data the Solomon Report concluded that the special
problems of the steel industry required faster results than could be ob-
tained through traditional dumping investigations. Thus, it recom-
mended the TPM not as a substitute for the Antidumping Act but as a
means for expediting dumping investigations. The TPM requires the
Secretary to immediately investigate any foreign sale below the predeter-
mined base or "trigger" price. Since the trigger price represents the ac-
tual cost of producing and shipping steel to the United States by the
most efficient foreign manufacturer, it is assumed that no foreign pro-
ducer could fairly sell steel for less. Consequently, any sale occurring
below the trigger price raises a rebuttable presumption that the sale was
6 See text accompanying notes 30-32, 91-92 infra.
7 A fast-track investigation is a Treasury Department phrase used to describe the acceler-
ation of a dumping investigation. SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 967-68. See text accom-
panying notes 30-32, 91-92 bnfra.
8 Material injury to the domestic steel industry means harm which is not "inconsequen-
tial, immaterial, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
9 Neither the term "fair value" nor "less than fair value" (LTFV) is defined in the An-
tidumping Act. However, fair value is analogous to "foreign market value," which is defined as
the price at which the product is sold in the exporting country increased by the cost of packag-
ing the product for shipment to the United States. Id. § 1677b(a)(1). Also, an important dis-
tinction exists between sales at "less than fair value" and "dumping." Sales at LTFV are not
illegal if they cause no injury to a domestic industry. In contrast, dumping is defined as sales at
LTFV that cause injury.
10 SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 965.
11 Id. at 964. In fact, the Solomon Report underestimates the delays that have occurred
under the Antidumping Act; of 19 dumping complaints filed since January 1975, only one had
reached even the tentative finding stage by January 1978. See id. at 963. See also 43 Fed. Reg.
22937 (1978).
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at less than fair value and the Secretary initiates a fast-track dumping
investigation.
In order to fully understand what is meant by a fast-track investiga-
tion, it is necessary to briefly examine the awesome complexity of the
Antidumping Act of 1921. The Antidumping Act authorizes the Secre-
tary' 2 to initiate dumping investigations sua sponte if he receives informa-
tion that sales at LTFV are occurring.13 In practice, however, this power
is rarely exercised.' 4 Consequently, the onus of detecting and reporting
foreign sales at LTFV falls on U.S. manufacturers. The Act requires any
manufacturer who suspects a foreign producer is dumping steel in the
United States to file a complicated petition with the Treasury Depart-
ment. 15 This petition must establish a prima facie case of sales at LTFV
by setting forth information such as the foreign producers' pricing
scheme, cost of production statistics, and estimates regarding the injury
causing potential of the imported product.1 6 Needless to say, problems
and expenses involved in collecting this information delay the filing of
dumping petitions and probably discourage some U.S. manufacturers
from pressing valid claims.
Once a satisfactory petition' 7 is finally filed with the Treasury De-
partment, no relief is immediately forthcoming.' 8 Before June 1979,
12 As ofJanuary 2, 1980, responsibility for administering the Antidumping Act was trans-
ferred from the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department in an effort to improve
enforcement of that Act. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). See also note 18
ia.
'3 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(a) (West Supp. 1979).
14 COMM. OF THE WHOLE HOUSE, STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R.
Doc. No. 96-153, Part II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1979), reprintedin [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 305 [hereinafter cited as STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION].
'5 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(b) (West Supp. 1979).
16 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.27(a)(2)-153.27(a)(3) (1979).
17 The Secretary has sweeping authority to return to the petitioner any petition that he
deems insufficient. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(c) (West Supp. 1979).
I8 The Treasury Department has a history of less than vigorous enforcement of trade legis-
lation. Until 1974 the Secretary was not required to complete a dumping investigation within
any specified time period. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974), repritled in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7306. Hence if the Secretary was displeased with a
petition filed by a U.S. manufacturer, he simply would not conduct an investigation of the
foreign producer charged with violating the Antidumping Act. The Treasury Department's
conduct was particulary eggregious with regard to the Countervailing Duty Act. Id. at 7318.
The Secretary literally refused to investigate some claims despite the repeated filing of petitions
by U.S. corporations. This conduct led the Congress to enact legislation in the Trade Act of
1974 requiring the Secretary to complete dumping investigations and publish a preliminary
finding within six months of the time that a dumping petition was filed. See 19 U.S.C. § 160
(1976) (amended 1979).
The Treasury Department's refusal to enforce vigorously trade legislation was a major fac-
tor in Congress' decision to shift enforcement responsibility for trade matters to the Commerce
Department. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2111 (West Supp. 1979); see also Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45
Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). Unfortunately, Commerce Department enforcement of the new An-
tidumping Act is off to an inauspicious beginning. The Commerce Department negated one of
the few improvements the Trade Agreements Act made in the Antidumping Act when it an-
nounced that it would not require foreign producers to deposit estimated dumping duties on
goods sold at LTFV. See 48 U.S.L.W. 2466 (Jan. 15, 1980). Instead foreign producers can post
bonds to cover their potential liability for dumping. Of course, it is much cheaper for a foreign
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when the Antidumping Act was amended,19 the Secretary could, at his
discretion, wait for nine months before issuing even a tentative finding of
whether sales at LTFV had occurred. 20 During this time, the foreign
producer could continue to sell his products in the United States with
impunity. 2 1 Further, even after he made a tentative finding of sales at
LTFV, the Secretary could wait an additional three months before issu-
ing a final determination of whether such sales had occurred. 22 Then,
assuming that sales at LTFV had occurred, there was yet another delay
while the case was referred to the International Trade Commission (ITC)
for a determination of whether the sales at LTFV had resulted in mate-
rial injury to the domestic steel industry. 23 Finally, after all these delays,
a dumping duty would be assessed only if the ITC concluded that the
sales had in fact resulted in material injury to the domestic steel industry.
The changes made in the antidumping statute by its amendment in
June 1979 by the Trade Agreements Act 24 promise to reduce delays only
slightly. The structure of the new Act substantially parallels the old; the
most significant change is a slight reduction in the period allowed for a
dumping investigation. The new Act requires the Secretary to publish a
preliminary determination of whether sales are occurring at LTFV
within 210 days, 60 days less than under the old statute.25 However, this
gain is partially nullified because the Secretary can, under certain cir-
cumstances, wait an additional 135 days before issuing a final determina-
tion.26 This is an increase of 45 days over the time period the old statute
granted the Secretary to make a final determination. 27 Thus, in complex
cases, the new Act will reduce investigatory delays by only 15 days.
The TPM is still an important feature of the U.S. trade program
producer to post a small bond than to deposit the entire amount of estimated dumping duties
while waiting for a final determination of whether dumping has occurred.
Current enforcement of trade legislation by the executive branch has generated fierce criti-
cism of U.S. policy. See Part IV in7fa.
19 The statute was amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1673-
77 (West Supp. 1979).
20 The Secretary had six months to publish a preliminary determination, but he could, at
his discretion, extend the investigatory period for an additional three months. 19 C.F.R.
§§ 153.31-153.32 (1979).
21 The Secretary was authorized to require a foreign producer to post a bond before im-
ported goods could be distributed, but this was not the usual practice of the Customs Service.
Id. § 153.50-153.51(a)(2).
22 Id. § 153.40.
23 Id. § 153.41.
24 19 U.S.C.A. 1673-77 (West Supp. 1979).
25 The Administering Authority, which is now the Commerce Department, see note 18
supra, must make a preliminary determination within 160 days. Id. § 1673b(b)(1). However,
the Authority may extend this period for an additional 75 days in "extraordinarily compli-
cated" cases.) Id. § 1673b(c). Since extraordinarily complicated cases are defined as those cases
involving complex transactions, novel issues or a number of firms, the Authority should have no
difficulty extending the investigatory period to 210 days. Id.
26 The Authority must publish a final determination 75 days after he announces his pre-
liminary determination. Id. § 1673d(a)(1). However, he can extend the period for an addi-
tional 60 days if the foreign producer so requests. Id. § 1673d(a)(2).
27 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(3) (1976) (amended 1979).
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despite the amendments made to the Antidumping Act by the Trade
Agreements Act. The TPM continues to function as a vehicle for initiat-
ing fast-track dumping investigations because the new statute failed to
correct two major shortcomings of the old Act with regard to the steel
industry. First, both the old Act and the new Act require U.S. manufac-
turers who file dumping petitions to develop detailed information con-
cerning the marketing strategies and production costs of foreign
manufacturers.28 Obviously, foreign producers are unwilling to disclose
this type of information freely to their U.S. competitors. Thus, steel in-
dustry officials assert that the Treasury Department should bear the bur-
den of developing the information necessary to prove sales at LTFV
inasmuch as it can use diplomatic pressure to obtain the information
from foreign governments.
Second, although the Secretary has the authority to initiate dump-
ing investigations sua sponle, in fact all investigations are initiated by pri-
vate individuals and corporations.2 9 The reason for this practice lies in
the Treasury Department's lack of a substantial incentive to report for-
eign exporters whom it suspects of dumping. Unlike domestic manufac-
turers, who lose substantial sales, customs agents do not have an
economic interest in preventing foreign producers from dumping their
products in the United States. Moreover, since it takes a considerable
amount of time to draft a dumping petition with all the required infor-
mation, U.S. manufacturers are unable to file petitions fast enough to
counter sudden surges in imported products. 30 Thus foreign producers
can, to a large extent, successfully evade the antidumping law.
The TPM is designed to overcome both of these problems with re-
gard to the basic steel industry. First, it shifts onto the Treasury Depart-
ment the burden of collecting the economic information required in a
dumping petition.3 1 The TPM accomplishes this shift by requiring the
Secretary to develop a data bank of statistical information on the most
efficient foreign producer of steel. 32 These data are used to calculate the
foreign producer's cost of production for steel products classified as basic
steel mill products by the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI). Us-
ing this information, the Secretary assigns AISI products a trigger price.
Second, the TPM shifts the burden of monitoring foreign exporters and
initiating dumping complaints from private enterprise to the Treasury
Department. Under the TPM the Secretary automatically commences a
dumping investigation, regardless of whether he receives an industry
28 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.27(a)(2)-153.27(a)(3) (1979). See also STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 412.
29 STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 412. See also H.R. REP.
No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979).
30 SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 965.
31 For a detailed list of the information required see 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.27(a)(2)-153.27(a)(3)
(1979).
32 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978).
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complaint, if a foreign manufacturer sells a steel product in the United
States for less than its trigger price. 33
As a result of these two reforms, the TPM has drastically reduced
the time period typically required for a dumping investigation. The
combination of a government maintained data bank on foreign cost of
production statistics and automatic investigations by the Secretary
whenever a foreign producer sells a product at less than its fair value has
cut delays under the Antidumping Act by more than two-thirds. 34 This
accelerated investigatory period is what the TPM refers to as a fast-track
investigation. Thus, as previously noted, the TPM does not replace the
Antidumping Act; it merely provides a mechanism for more quickly ini-
tiating and completing investigations. 35
II. Calculation of the Trigger Price
The TPM directs the Secretary of the Treasury to determine cost of
production statistics for the most efficient foreign producer, and since it is
widely conceded that the Japanese are the most efficient steelmakers in
the world, the Secretary has collected information on the six largest Jap-
anese steel manufacturers.3 6 To help gather this information, the Secre-
tary appointed a Steel Price Task Force in March 1978.37 Working with
information supplied by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), the Task Force calculates the trigger price in the
following manner for any given Japanese steel product imported into the
United States. Initially, a raw material component is calculated by de-
termining the cost of basic raw materials such as iron ore, alloys and
lubricants, plus the fees paid to the producers' subsidiaries for processing
coke.38 Labor costs per raw ton of steel are then added to the raw mate-
rial component.3 9 Next to be added are overhead expenses, which in-
clude rental and lease charges, machine repairs and plant
maintenance. 40 Then an allowance is made for depreciation. 4' After the
depreciation allowance is calculated, certain capital charges must be
computed, which include interest payments on corporate notes and a
profit estimate of eight percent per annum.
4 2
At this point, all of these cost of production statistics are added to-
gether to yield a subtotal. This subtotal is then recalculated to reflect the
percentage of plant capacity being utilized by the Japanese producers.
43
33 SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 967.
34 Id. at 967-68. See also text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
35 See Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 292 (D.D.C. 1978).
36 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978).
37 Id. at 1464, 32710.
38 Id. at 32711-12.
39 Id. at 32712.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 32710-11.
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This recalculation reflects the Task Force's belief that some costs (labor)
increase as production increases, while others either decrease (overhead)
or remain unchanged (raw materials). The recalculated subtotal is now
reduced by a yield credit.44 The yield credit reflects the amount of
finished steel products that can be extracted from crude steel. Any scrap
resulting from the production process is melted down and reused as a
raw material, hence it is deducted from the total cost of the product.
In short, as shown in Table 1 below, the Treasury Department cal-
culates the cost of production per net finished ton of steel by adding the
cost of raw materials, labor, overhead and capital charges, adjusted by a
variable for capacity utilization, less a yield credit.
TABLE 1
COST OF PRODUCTION PER NET FINISHED TON OF STEEL*
Raw Material Component
(basic raw materials plus other material costs)
Labor
Other Expenses
(including overhead)
Depreciation
Capital Charges
(interest due plus profit estimate)
Subtotal
Less Yield Credit
Total Cost Per Net Ton
*Assume prior recalculation to reflect capacity utihization.
Source: Adopted from 44 Fed. Reg. 11633 (1979).
The Steel Price Task Force makes two further adjustments to the
cost of production figure shown in the table above to arrive at the trigger
price. First, an allowance is made for the depreciation of the dollar
against the yen. 45 Second, the cost of shipping the steel from Japan to
the United States is calculated according to the particular port of en-
try.46 Shipping costs to the West Coast and Gulf ports are lowest, while
costs to East Coast and Great Lake ports are highest. The resulting base
price is designated as the trigger price. It represents the minimum fair
value cost of the product in the United States.
44 Id. at 32711.
45 Id. at 32711-12. It should be noted that recently the dollar has been sharply appreciat-
ing against the yen and this has been a major force in stabilizing the TPM.
46 Id. at 47809.
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In order to ensure compliance with the TPM, the Treasury Depart-
ment has adopted a new form, the Special Summary Steel Invoice
(SSSI).4 7 Foreign producers are required to fill out an SSSI in duplicate
for each shipment of products subject to the TPM that have an aggre-
gate purchase price over $10,000.48 The SSSI must specify both the ap-
plicable trigger price and the manufacturer's unit invoice price for the
imported product.49 The foreign manufacturer must mail one copy of
the SSSI to the Customs Service immediately upon export of the prod-
ucts so that it will arrive prior to the shipment. 50 The other copy of the
SSSI remains with the shipment for identification purposes. Upon re-
ceipt of the SSSI, the Customs Service forwards it to the Special Customs
Steel Task Force in Washington for analysis. If the forms reflect substan-
tial or repeated shipments below trigger prices, the Secretary will initiate
a dumping investigation sua sponhe.
In practice, foreign manufacturers, and European producers in par-
ticular, have not fully complied with the TPM requirements regarding
SSSI forms. 5t As a result, the Treasury Department has adopted a get-
tough policy, requiring complete information on the SSSI as a condition
of entry into the United States.52 Thus, all shipments that arrive before
the Special Customs Steel Task Force receives an SSSI, or any shipments
that contain otherwise inadequate documentation, are subject to denial
of entry. Furthermore, in at least one case the Treasury Department has
initiated a dumping investigation against a manufacturer for failing to
provide information required by the SSSI.
53
The constant monitoring of steel imports made possible by SSSI
forms prevents foreign manufacturers from shifting their product mix to
avoid assessment of dumping duties.54  Before the TPM was imple-
mented, whenever a U.S. corporation filed a complaint with the Secre-
tary alleging that a foreign manufacturer was dumping a certain
47 The SSSI is designated Customs Form 5520 and should not'be confused with Customs
Form 5515 (the Special Customs Invoice) after which it is modeled. A sample of the form with
instructions for filling it out is printed in 44 Fed. Reg. 12414-16 (1979). Copies of the SSSI may
be obtained from any district director of Customs or from the U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
48 Id. at 12411-12. Originally, all sales over $2500 required an SSSI form. 42 Fed. Reg.
65214-15 (1977). Because the Treasury Department found that it was inundated with paper
work as a result of this requirement, the threshold was raised in March 1979 to $10,000 for all
imports except those coming from Canada and Mexico. The threshold for imports from these
countries is $5000. 44 Fed. Reg. 12411-12 (1979).
49 42 Fed. Reg. 65215 (1977). The TPM also requires manufacturers to specify the cur-
rency and the rate of exchange used to arrive at the unit sales price stated on the SSSI. 43 Fed.
Reg. 6068 (1978).
50 42 Fed. Reg. 65215 (1977).
51 Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1978, at 12, col. 3.
52 Id.
53 Id. The Treasury initiated an investigation of a Spanish company, Empresa Nacional
Siderurgica, S.A., for providing inadequate documentation on its SSSI form. The Treasury
later discontinued the investigation when it appeared that the company had made only two
shipments below applicable trigger prices. Id.
54 See SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 966.
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product, that manufacturer would merely cease dumping the product
under investigation and shift its sales at LTFV to another item in its
product line.55 In other words, if a dumping complaint were filed
against a foreign manufacturer for sales of alloy steel plates at LTFV,
that manufacturer would stop dumping alloy steel plates and begin to
sell carbon steel plates at LTFV. In order to prevent sales of the carbon
steel plates at LTFV, the U.S. corporation would have to collect all the
economic data required by the Antidumping Act and the Trade Act of
1974 and file a new dumping complaint. This would involve a delay of
several months, and when the new complaint was filed, the foreign man-
ufacturer would shift his LTFV sales to yet another product outside the
scope of the investigation. The TPM corrects this problem by allowing
the Treasury Department to monitor steel imports on an industry-wide
basis instead of focusing on specific products. Foreign producers cannot
shift their LTFV sales from one product to another because the sale of
any item below the applicable trigger price may result in an immediate
investigation by the Secretary.
III. Legal Challenges to the TPM
Less than three months after the implementation of the TPM in
January 1978, the validity of the program was challenged in Davt' Walker
Corp. v. Blumenthal.56 Davis Walker manufactured wire and wire prod-
ucts that were excluded from protection under the TPM. 57 Davis
Walker contended that it was damaged because the TPM increased
prices for imported steel used as its raw materials but did not similarly
affect competing imports of the wire products that it produced. In other
words, Davis Walker was caught in a price squeeze. The TPM made it
more expensive for Davis Walker to manufacture steel-fabricated prod-
ucts, but it did not prevent foreign producers from selling finished
fabricated products in the United States at LTFV. 58
Davis Walker sought an injunction and challenged the TPM on
three grounds. First, Davis Walker asserted that the TPM circumvented
the elaborate statutory procedures established by the Antidumping Act
to determine sales at LTFV.59 The corporation reasoned that the TPM
would inhibit foreign producers from selling steel in the United States for
less than its trigger price. Therefore, the TPM in effect imposed a dump-
ing duty on all goods for which trigger prices had been set without fol-
lowing the procedures required in the Antidumping Act. Second, Davis
Walker claimed that the TPM was a substantive rule subject to the rule-
making requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
55 Id. at 965.
56 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978).
57 Id. at 286.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 289.
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was therefore invalid for failure to comply with the standards of the
APA.60 Finally, Davis Walker asserted that the Treasury Department's
classification scheme, which excluded steel wire and wire products from
control under the TPM, was arbitrary and capricious in violation of sec-
tion 706 of the APA.6 1
After a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that
Davis Walker had "demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succeeding
on the merits of its claim that the inclusion of steel wire rod in the 'trig-
ger price system' without the simultaneous inclusion of steel wire and-
wire products is arbitrary and capricious in violation of section 706(2) (A)
of the Administrative Procedure Act."'62 Accordingly, on March 24,
1978, the court ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to show cause why
wire products should not be included within the trigger price system and
granted a preliminary injunction against his enforcement of the TPM as
it pertained to steel wire rods.63
On April 10, the Secretary submitted a report to the court stating
his reasons for not including fabricated steel wire products in the trigger
price system. 64 The Secretary asserted that there was an almost infinite
variety of "extras" that could alter the price of any fabricated product.
Extras include the grade of the steel, the chemistry of the particular al-
loys, and the size and cut of the finished product. Since the calculation
of trigger prices for all extras on fabricated products would be impossi-
ble, the Treasury Department was unwilling to expand the TPM beyond
the few wire products listed by the AISI as basic steel mill products. 65 As
a result, many of the fabricated steel wire products produced by Davis
Walker were excluded from the TPM.
After submitting his report, the Secretary filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment. On May 25, the court dissolved the preliminary injunc-
tion and granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on all
three issues in Davis Walker's complaint. 66 The court rejected Davis
Walker's contention that the TPM imposed dumping duties and thus
circumvented the procedures set forth in the Antidumping Act. It held
that "[t]he decision by foreign manufacturers to increase prices to the
trigger price level is not the legal equivalent of the imposition of dump-
ing duties with respect to all such goods imported at the trigger price
level."'67 The court found that the Antidumping Act authorized the Sec-
60 d.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 296.
66 Id. at 289.
67 Id. at 292.
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retary to make rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of the
Act and that the Act did not restrict the means by which the Secretary
obtained information sufficient to initiate an investigation. 68 Conse-
quently, the court held that the TPM was a legitimate device to monitor
imports and to provide the Secretary with sufficient information to en-
able him to initiate an investigation on his own motion.
The court also rejected Davis Walker's assertion that the TPM was
invalid for failure to comply with the rule-making requirements of the
APA. The APA requires notice and comment procedures for substantive
rules but specifically exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from
these requirements. 69 The court concluded that the TPM was a policy
statement rather than a substantive rule and not subject to the rule-mak-
ing requirements of the APA.70
Finally, the court declined to accept Davis Walker's argument that
the TPM was arbitrary and capricious as it pertained to steel wire rods.
It held that the Secretary's decision to limit the TPM to AISI steel mill
products was rational because it allowed the Treasury to focus its en-
forcement energies on the area most urgently needing attention, namely,
the basic steel mill industry.7 1 The court stated that it was not necessary
to find that the Treasury's classification scheme was the only reasonable
one, or even that the court would have reached the same result. Rather,
if the Secretary's decision had a rational basis, then it was not arbitrary
or capricious within the meaning of section 706 of the APA.72
Subsequently, and perhaps as a result of the Davi's Walker suit, the
Secretary expanded the scope of the TPM to cover some wire products
manufactured by Davis Walker. 73 According to the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Secretary's goal is to cover the vast majority of steel products
68 Id. at 293.
69 Id. at 293-94.
70 Id. at 294. At present the majority view holds that the Secretary's decision to impose
dumping duties under the Antidumping Act is rule-making and not adjudication. See, e.g., Elof
Hanson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922, 928 (Cust. Ct. 1959), rev'don other grounds, 296
F.2d 799 (C.C.P.A. 1960), cert. denid, 368 U.S. 899 (1961); Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the
United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 149 (1973); Myerson,
A Review of Current Antidumping Procedures: United States Law and the Case ofjapan, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 196 (1976). Fisher and Myerson argue, however, that the Secretary's deter-
minations are often adjudicatory in nature and that importers should be given the benefit of the
greater procedural safeguards required by the APA for adjudicatory hearings.
71 460 F. Supp. at 296.
72 Id. at 296-97.
73 The Secretary informed the court that it would consider expanding the TPM to include
"additional products should circumstances warrant it." Id. at 291. In fact, the TPM has been
expanded well beyond the products to which it was originally limited. See 44 Fed. Reg. 4767
(1979). The expansion of the TPM may well have been the price the Secretary felt he had to
pay in order to prevent further challenges to the TPM. A full list of the products covered by the
TPM as of the third quarter of 1979 is published in 44 Fed. Reg. 29790-804 (1979).
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imported into the United States without so broadening the scope of the
TPM as to make it impossible to administer.7 4
IV. Steel Industry Criticism of the TPM
Although the Secretary continues to expand the scope of the TPM
to include more fabricated steel products, criticism of the program by
U.S. steelmakers has not subsided. 75 In fact, it is ironic that major U.S.
producers of basic steel mill products are the most forceful critics of the
TPM. These manufacturers, who led the fight for strong protective
measures and whose representatives helped draft the program, now
charge that the TPM is a failure because it does not prevent dumping.
76
U.S. producers of basic steel mill products began to complain about the
TPM shortly after the first trigger prices were announced in January
1978. They asserted that MITI, in figures it supplied to the Treasury
Department, had grossly underestimated Japanese manufacturing costs.
Yielding to this pressure from domestic producers, the Secretary sent the
Steel Price Task Force to Japan to investigate the MITI figures. The
Task Force concluded, however, that the Japanese figures were essen-
tially correct and it made only slight revisions in the trigger price.
77
Despite the findings of the Task Force, U.S. manufacturers have
continued to complain that TPM prices are set too low. From March
1978 to March 1979, trigger prices were raised by 10.6%.7a The sharpest
rise, 7%, occurred during the first quarter of 1979.79 Nevertheless, even
this 7% increase did not reflect the actual cost increase of 10% to Japa-
nese manufacturers. This is because the TPM contains a built-in "flexi-
bility band" that allows the Secretary, at his discretion, to reduce by up
to 5% any increase in trigger prices.8 0
Since most of the 10% actual cost increase to Japanese manufactur-
ers in the first quarter of 1979 was due to the sharp depreciation of the
dollar against the yen, the Secretary elected to reduce the TPM hike by
3%.1" The Secretary's decision to raise trigger prices by only 7% in order
to smooth out sharp fluctuations in currency values incensed U.S. manu-
facturers.8 2 The president of U.S. Steel, David M. Roderick, criticized
the Secretary's action and stated that the move in effect allowed the Jap-
anese to dump their steel at 3% below cost.
8 3
Mr. Roderick also asserted that the TPM has failed to halt the flood
of imported steel into the United States.8 4 Steel imports from January
74 The Secretary asserts that the TPM covers 90% of all steel products imported into the
United States. 44 Fed. Reg. 29789 (1979).
75 NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 105.
76 Id.
77 43 Fed. Reg. 32710 (1978).
78 Id. at 54711.
79 44 Fed. Reg. 29789 (1979).
80 Id. The Secretary may use the flexibility band to increase the TPM as well as decrease
it. Id.
81 Id.
82 Wall St. J., supra note 51, at col. 2.
83 Id.
84 NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 105.
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through September 1978, after the implementation of the TPM, were
19% higher than in the same period in 1977. U.S. Steel and other manu-
facturers attributed this increase to basic flaws in the structure of the
TPM. Trigger prices are calculated according to Japanese production
costs; less efficient European producers can sell their products in the
United States for the same price as the Japanese without triggering a
dumping investigation by the Secretary. For example, Romanian steel-
makers 5 can sell their products on the West Coast for the same price as
Japanese producers without violating the TPM. However, because
Romanians are relatively inefficient steelmakers, it costs them more to
produce one ton of steel than it costs the Japanese to produce one ton of
steel. Similarly, it costs more to ship steel to the West Coast from
Romania than it does from Japan. Thus, when Romanian steel is sold
on the West Coast for the same price as Japanese steel, it must of neces-
sity be selling at less than its actual cost of production. Nevertheless,
such sales do not violate the TPM and do not trigger an investigation by
the Secretary for possible violation of the Antidumping Act. This prac-
tice outrages U.S. steelmakers.
The Secretary admits that many European producers are importing
steel at LTFV, but argues that these sales do not constitute dumping.8 6
The Antidumping Act specifies that sales at LTFV do not constitute
dumping unless they result in material injury to domestic producers.
The Secretary asserts that it is impossible to prove injury as a conse-
quence of sales at LTFV so long as Japanese plants are operating at less
than full capacity and could increase exports to the United States.
8 7
The soundness of the Secretary's reasoning in this regard is question-
able. It is true that Japanese steel mills are operating at less than full
capacity. However, since there is already a surplus of steel, the Japanese
have no intention of increasing production and further depressing prices.
Moreover, the fact that the Japanese could increase sales without violat-
ing the Antidumping Act does not justify permitting European produc-
ers to sell their products at LTFV. The Secretary is essentially usurping
the power of the ITC by refusing to investigate claims that sales have
been made at LTFV. The ITC, not the Secretary, is authorized to deter-
85 A Romanian steelmaker may incur an actual production cost of as much as $425 a ton;
if the trigger price is $350 a ton, the company will sell at $350 in the United States with the
Romanian Government subsidizing the $75 loss. As a result, Romanian steel sells for less in the
United States than domestic steel. Mark Anthony, president of Kaiser Steel, argues "[wle've got
imports from Belgium, Japan, Italy, Taiwan, West Germany, France, South Africa, Korea and
Romania-all of them selling lower than Kaiser. Now you tell me how the West Coast is a
natural market for Romania, and I'll eat everything they sell." Id.
86 SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 969.
87 Id.
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mine whether such sales have caused or are likely to result in material
inj.ury to domestic producers.
V. Conclusion
When the TPM was conceived, it was widely believed that dumping
by Japanese manufacturers was the primary nemesis of U.S. steel-
makers. a8 Domestic manufacturers argued that they could successfully
compete against Japanese products if Japanese prices reflected the true
cost of manufacturing their steel. Thus, the TPM was structured so as to
detect possible violations of the Antidumping Act by Japanese manufac-
turers.8 9 To this end, the TPM has been successful. Japanese steel im-
ports declined by 14.9% in 1978. 90 This success in controlling Japanese
imports is attributable to three improvements the TPM has made in the
administration of the Antidumping Act. First, the TPM requires the
government to assume the burden of collecting the economic data on
Japanese steelmakers required in a dumping petition by the Trade Act of
1974 and the Antidumping Act. Second, the Secretary now initiates in-
vestigations on his own accord whenever it appears that a foreign manu-
facturer has made sales at LTFV. This prevents foreign manufacturers
from constantly shifting prices on different products to avoid detection of
sales at LTFV. Even a brief period of sales at less than the trigger price
will result in an investigation. Third, the automatic initiation of a
dumping investigation whenever an SSSI form reveals possible sales at
LTFV has greatly reduced the bureaucratic delays inherent in the An-
tidumping Act. The investigatory period is reduced sharply because the
Secretary already has the necessary data on Japanese costs of production
to determine whether sales at LTFV have occurred. As a result, dump-
ing investigations that used to take a year or more are now completed in
approximately four months. 9' This accelerated, fast-track form of inves-
tigation was a key goal set forth in the Solomon Report. 92
Unfortunately, despite its success in controlling dumping by Japa-
nese manufacturers, the structure of the TPM is totally inadequate to
prevent dumping by other foreign steelmakers. In fact, the TPM has
added a degree of legitimacy to steel sales at LTFV by non-Japanese
steelmakers. So long as they do not go below the trigger price, these
manufacturers may sell their products at LTFV without fear that the
88 Ironically, no Japanese steelmakers violated the TPM during 1978, the TPM's first year
of operation. However, the Treasury has initiated investigations against the Stahlexport
Przesiebioratwoa of Poland, the China Steel Corporation of Taiwan, and Empresa Nacional
Siderurgica, S.A. of Spain. Wall St. J., supra note 51, at col. 3. The case against the Spanish
company has already been dropped, see note 53 supra.
89 43 Fed. Reg. 1464 (1978).
90 NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 105.
91 Telephone interview with John P. Nolan, Industrial Analyst, Office of Special Pro-
grams, Treasury Department (Mar. 29, 1979). The author wishes to thank Mr. Nolan for read-
ing this paper and making many helpful suggestions.
92 SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 967-68.
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Secretary will initiate a dumping investigation. Consequently, since the
adoption of the TPM, steel imports to the United States from Common
Market countries have risen dramatically, increasing 26.4%.93
In order to protect themselves from low priced European steel im-
ports, U.S. manufacturers must go through the entire complex procedure
established by the Antidumping Act without the benefit of shortcuts
made possible by the TPM. They must collect the economic data on the
foreign steelmaker required by the Antidumping Act. They must file a
dumping petition with the Secretary that covers only one steel product,
thus permitting the foreign steelmaker to alternate dumping products
within its product line without fear of detection. And finally, U.S. steel-
makers do not benefit from the TPM's fast-track investigatory period.
At best, then, the TPM has met with limited success. The reduction
in Japanese steel imports has been offset to a degree by the increase in
European imports. However, U.S. steelmakers have benefitted from the
TPM despite increased European imports because the TPM allows them
to raise their profit margin. 94 A by-product of the dollar's sharp decline
against the yen is that a significantly higher trigger price has resulted.95
Previously, Japanese manufacturers absorbed some of the impact of cur-
rency fluctuations in order to keep their products competitive, even if it
meant selling at LTFV. Such behavior is no longer possible because it
would trigger an automatic fast-track dumping investigation. U.S. steel-
makers have taken advantage of this situation by raising their prices to a
level just below the trigger price. Thus, to the extent that their costs
have not risen as rapidly as the trigger price, U.S. steelmakers have real-
ized greater profits. 96
The problem is that even at these higher profit levels U.S. manufac-
turers are struggling to compete with the Japanese. Despite all the com-
plaints about European steel, the real competition in the long run will
continue to come from Japan. What the TPM has proven is that old,
inefficient U.S. plants are at least as much the cause of lagging U.S. steel
sales as unfair competition from foreign producers. 97 Unfortunately, an-
tiquated production facilities are a problem that the trigger price mecha-
93 NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 105.
94 Consumer groups allege that sharp increases in the TPM have contributed to U.S. in-
flation. Id.
95 See 43 Fed. Reg. 54712 (1978).
96 NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 105.
97 Even the Solomon Report, in its recommendation to the President to adopt trigger
prices, noted that the TPM alone, without modernization of U.S. steel plants, would not suc-
ceed in the long run in stemming the tide of imports. SOLOMON REPORT, supra note 3, at 973-
81.
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nism cannot solve, and, in the long run, greater U.S. efficiency is the only
solution to foreign competition. 98
-JOHN JAY RANGE
Editorial Postscript
On March 21, 1980, as this article went to the printer, U.S. Steel
Corporation filed massive dumping petitions against seven European
steelmakers. As the author predicted, the Commerce Department retali-
ated by temporarily suspending further enforcement of the TPM until
such time as U.S. Steel withdraws its dumping petitions. Whether U.S.
Steel will yield to this pressure, and whether the TPM will be reinsti-
tuted, cannot be determined at this time. The editors feel, however, that
this article continues to be relevant because it examines many of the is-
sues raised by the present dispute, namely: does the TPM accurately re-
flect Japanese steel production costs; does it adequately protect U.S.
steelmakers from European imports; and can the Commerce Department
enforce the cumbersome Antidumping Act without the TPM?
98 Whether the TPM will survive 1980 is presently an open question. When the TPM was
implemented, there was a tacit understanding between the government and the steel industry
that the steelmakers would forego filing dumping petitions in exchange for automatic dumping
investigations whenever the trigger price was violated. But world demand for steel is declining
after a relatively strong sales year in 1979 and U.S. steelmakers are increasingly concerned
about dumping by foreign manufacturers. Because of its disenchantment with the TPM, U.S.
Steel has threatened to file multiple dumping petitions. Such action could cause the Commerce
Department to retaliate by terminating the TPM. TIME, Mar. 17, 1980, at 66-67.
